Loyola Consumer Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 2020

Article 5

2020

Algorithms Take Flight: Modern Pricing Algorithms' Effect On
Antitrust Laws in the Aviation Industry
David Krieghbaum Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David Krieghbaum Jr. Algorithms Take Flight: Modern Pricing Algorithms' Effect On Antitrust Laws in the
Aviation Industry, 32 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 282 ().
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/lclr/vol32/iss2/5

This Feature Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Loyola Consumer Law Review by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information,
please contact law-library@luc.edu.

Loyola ConsumerLaw Re view

[V ol. 3 2:2

ALGORITHMS TAKE FLIGHT: MODERN
PRICING ALGORITHMS' EFFECT ON
ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE AVIATION
INDUSTRY
By: David KrieghbaumJr.
ABSTRACT
What happens when an inevitable moving force collides
with an immovable object? Either the force finds a way around the
object or the object must adapt to contain the force. Over a century
has passed since the federal government passed the Sherman Act,
Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act. As times change,
the three reigning laws have had very little reform. Federal antitrust laws remain immovable through the past century as civilization has made astounding advancements. The advancement of
technology in business is inevitably becoming a large part of how
corporations are securing advantages against their competition.
Artificial intelligence and algorithms can make real-time business
decisions while weighing thousands of factors. Self-learning artificial intelligence can make real-time decisions and learn from every
mistake they have ever made. However, these "robo-sellers" call
into question whether federal antitrust laws can properly regulate
and punish a decision made by an inanimate object. Because artificial intelligence is so beneficial to businesses (and society), should
antitrust laws worry about them?
Real-time pricing decisions have become especially important in the aviation industry. Airlines are dependent on pricing
algorithms to remain profitable-perhaps even at the expense of
consumers. The airline industry's oligopoly market increases the
risk of consumer harm. Airlines have a long-standing history with
federal antitrust laws and the addition of pricing algorithms in
their businesses has not appeared to decrease the momentum of
antitrust litigation.
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In 2010, the financial market suffered the "Flash Crash."
Algorithmic trade activity caused a chain reaction which led to the
S&P 500, Nasdaq 100, and Dow Jones temporarily dropping. The
financial industry panicked before prices eventually bounced
back. A Flash Crash in the airline industry would be disastrous
because of society's reliance on air transportation. Regulators need
to learn from the financial market's Flash Crash mistake.
In this Article, I argue that the airline industry is in a position where it can leverage its oligopoly market and pricing-algorithm technology in a manner that is harmful to consumers. I argue
that it would be in the best interest of both airlines and the government to develop a new method of regulating the pricing algorithms
that are used in the airline industry.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a world where artificial intelligence runs a large
corporate department with minimal human interaction. Well, that
world will be here sooner than you can imagine.1 Algorithms "work
with a huge amount of data, unimaginably fast, without interruptions, without emotions, and increasingly also without human involvement."2 Companies that employ robo-sellers (pricing algorithms) are at a clear advantage over those companies. that do not.
Robo-sellers remove human error in pricing decisions, employment expenses, and other labor expenses. However, as this Article
discusses, there are several issues that arise with the implementation of pricing algorithms-especially in the airline industry context.3

The airline industry is evolving quickly and does not seem
to be slowing down. 4 Airlines use technology, such as artificial

1 See Charlie Osborne, Future Enterprise Companies Will Be Run by Robots, ZDNET (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:25 AM), https://www.zdnet.com/article/futureenterprise-companies-will-be-ran-by-robots/.
2 VAclav Smejkal, Cartels by Robots - CurrentAntitrust Lawin Search of
an Answer, 4 J. INT'L & EUR. L., ECON. & MKT. INTEGRATIONS 1, 3 (2017).
s See infra Part V.

^ 2036 ForecastReveals Air Passengers Will NearlyDouble to 7.8 Billion,
INT'L
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intelligence, to keep their business profitable-especially pricing
algorithms.' As this technology is new and airlines are at the forefront of their usage, the airline industry has become a "guinea pig"
for antitrust regulators. For example, in United States v. Airline
TariffPublishingCo.,6 the Department of Justice ("DOJ") investigated several major airlines and the Airline Tariff Publishing
Company ("ATP") for price fixing.7 The airlines were using hidden
messages in ATP's database to communicate with each other to
"increase [airfare], eliminate discounts, and set fare restrictions."'
All parties eventually settled, but the DOJ made it clear that they
will investigate intra-airline pricing discussions-even discussions
made through technology, like pricing algorithms.
The government will undoubtedly face difficulties regulating pricing algorithms in the airline industry using current antitrust laws. First, the airline industry is an oligopoly.' Firms in an
oligopoly market are at an advantage because of a "crack" in antitrust law. 10 It is difficult for antitrust regulators to prove that parallel pricing in an oligopoly is a manifestation of concerted, rather
than unilateral, behavior." If there are only three firms in a market
and their objective is, presumably, to maximize profit, then it
would benefit all three firms to coordinate and price their product
or service higher than what is competitive-at a supracompetitive
price." If the firms regularly monitor each other's pricing, then
https://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2017-10-24-01.aspx(discussing research on how the airline industry is growing internationally).
5 See Tom Chitty, This Is HowAirlines Price Tickets, CNBC (Aug. 3, 2018,
11:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/03/how-do-airlines-price-seat-tickets.html.
6 See

infra Section V(a).

Impact Statement at 1-2, United States v. Airline Tariff
Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.C. 1993) (No. 92-2854).
SId. at 10.
9 Jonathan M. Bruneau, Concentration Within the US. Airline Industry:A
"NaturalPhenomenon"or an "Ordinary"Monopoly/Oligopoly Resultingfrom
the Behaviour of Competitors?, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 123, 123-24 (1992);
for a discussion of oligopoly, see discussion infra Section V(b).
10 See discussion infra Section IV(b).
" Alan Devlin, A Proposed Solution to the Problem of ParallelPricingin
OligopolisticMarkets, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2007).
12 Id. at 1113-15.
284
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they can fix their prices without concerted action.13 Another problem, which logically flows from the first issue, is how pricing algorithms can help oligopoly firms hide traces of concerted action. 4
Both of these issues are pressing concerns that will surely shape
competition regulations in the airline industry.
This Article evaluates the obstacles, issues, and possible solutions that the airline industry and its regulators face with the advent of pricing algorithms. Part II discusses how businesses and
airlines use artificial intelligence and pricing algorithms. Part III
discusses the pertinent federal antitrust laws-Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission Act-with a focus on the
Sherman Act. Part IV analyzes cases in which algorithms were the
focal point of the litigation. Additionally, this part explores the
challenges that algorithms provide for antitrust regulators. Part V
provides examples of antitrust litigation involving airlines and discusses the potential harm that pricing algorithms in the airline industry can cause. Part VI provides a recommendation for government regulators and airlines moving forward. Technology is an
inevitable force that will find its way around the immovable federal antitrust laws-that is, unless they adapt.

II.

PRICING ALGORITHMS HASSLING WITH
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS

"We will not tolerate anticompetitive conduct, whether it
occurs in a smoke-filled room or over the Internet using complex
pricing algorithms.""
Algorithms,1 6 along with their artificial intelligence capabilities, have become "so pervasive in modern society that they track,
3

Id

See discussion infra Section IV(b)(i).
1s U.S. DEP'T JUST., Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price
Fixing in the Antitrust Division's First Online Marketplace Prosecution(last
updated Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opalpr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-first-online-marketplace.
16 Artificial intelligence and machine learning are intensive topics mentioned throughout this Article. This background section is intended to provide
you with the necessary knowledge and context to understand the discussion that
285
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predict and influence how individuals behave in nearly all aspects
of life."" "[A]n algorithm is a sequence of rules that should be performed in an exact order to carry out a certain task ... that generates an output from a given input, whether it is a method to solve
a mathematical problem, a food recipe, or a music sheet." 8 Originally, long strings of code were required for algorithms to function.
Today, algorithms are teaching themselves and creating their own
code through machine learning-a subset of artificial intelligence.19 It is unsurprising that businesses would take advantage of
the efficiency and cost savings that accompany employing an algorithmic-machine over a human. This Part discusses how businesses and airlines use pricing algorithms.
A. Businesses' Utilization of PricingAlgorithms
Businesses are employing algorithms to gain a competitive
edge over their rivals. This creates a domino effect of global digitalization, encouraging firms to develop and use algorithms so they
can compete with their competition. 20 Businesses are employing algorithms for two broad functions: predictive analytics and optimizing business processes." The first function, predictive analytics, allows businesses to "[e]stimate demand, forecast price
changes, predict customer behavior and preferences, assess risks
and forecast . . . the entry of new firms." The second function,
optimizing business processes, encompasses an algorithm's ability
to "reduc[e] production and transaction costs, [segment] customers
[and]. . . [set] optimal prices that effectively respond to market circumstances."2 3 An algorithm's benefits arise from its ability to

follows. For additional information on artificial intelligence, see Antonio A.
Martino, ArtificialIntelligenceandLaw, 2 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 154(1994).
For additional information on machine learning, see Harry Surden, Machine
Learningand Law, 89 WASH. L. REv. 87 (2014).
1 OECD, ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION: COMPETITION POLICY IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 7 (2017) [hereinafter ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION].

18

19
20

Id at 8.
Id at 9.
Id at 11-12.

21

Id at 11.

22

Id
Id

23
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analyze large sets of data and make quick, accurate, and efficient
business decisions.24 The 'optimizing business processes' function
is particularly relevant because it includes an algorithm's pricing
capabilities.
Can you imagine the inefficiencies a modern business
would encounter if it still used human pricing? Not only would it
cost the business valuable employee time because of the necessary
diligence, but instances of calculation inaccuracies would be much
more frequent. Pricing algorithms-through dynamic pricingprice products and services based on an enormous amount of data
points. Pricing algorithms will look at factors such as market segments, date, time, available stock, and anticipated demand-the
list of factors is endless.25 Companies can even use computer 'cookies' to access the consumer's internet browsing history to customize their pricing. 26 Businesses in several industries-travel, retail,
sports, and entertainment-use pricing algorithms.2 7 Pricing algorithms use machine learning to become more sophisticated. Machine learning is the process by which algorithms "learn through
trial and error and [find] patterns from a great volume and variety
of data, leading to optimal pricing." 8 A benefit of using dynamic
pricing is that over time, as the algorithm accumulates data and
experiments with different pricing combinations, "pricing becomes
more dynamic, differentiated and personalized" from machine
learning. 29 For example, an airline's pricing algorithm will accumulate data over time and use this data to price airfare. If it prices
airfare at an inefficient rate, then its artificial intelligence will
adapt, using machine learning, and not make that mistake again.
Over a significant period of time-with the accumulation of a significant amount of data-an airline's pricing algorithm will have
years of pricing experience and will never forget a previous mistake. Less obviously, consumers also benefit from dynamic pricing
in businesses. The consumer benefits from dynamic pricing's

24

Id.

25

Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion:

When Computers Inhibit Competition, 2017 U. ILL. L. REv. 1775, 1780 (2017).
26 Robert M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Online Dynamic Pricing: Efficiency, Equity and the Future of E-Commerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, ¶ 13
(2001).
2 Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 25, at 1780.
28 ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION, supra note 17, at 16.
2 ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION, supra note 17, at 16.
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Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[Vol. 3 2:2

ability to keep the market in equilibrium-preventing unsatisfied
demand which leads to higher prices.30
Dynamic pricing has garnered the name 'perfect price discrimination' because it is capable of considering data such as a
consumer's location, browsing history, previous purchases, and
other private information.3 1 Companies and their pricing algorithms' access to this intimate data comes with both positive and
negative results. One positive aspect is that companies can provide
lower prices for consumers who have a low willingness to pay.3 2
Because the. technology takes into account everything it knows
about a consumer, it can provide that individual consumer with a
price that is mutually beneficial to the consumer and the company.
On the other hand, computers could discriminate based on characteristics such as gender or race.33 For the good and the bad, the
business world greatly benefits from dynamic pricing to optimize
and individualize its products and services for its customers. The
airline industry is at the forefront of employing dynamic pricing.
B. Airlines' Utilization of PricingAlgorithms
Airlines use algorithms to price their airfare under the dynamic pricing economic theory.34 Experts have trouble agreeing on
a definition of dynamic pricing, sometimes referred to as yield
management.35 However, American Airlines once defined the objective of yield management as "maximiz[ing] passenger revenue
by selling the right seats to the rightcustomers at the right time." 36
The factors that airlines use to price airfare-through pricing

supra note 17, at 16.
17, at 16.
3 ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION, supra note 17, at 16.
3 ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION, supra note 17, at 16.
34 Lisa Magloff, Dynamic Pricing Strategy, CHRON, https://smallbusiness.chron.com/dynamic-pricing-strategy-5117.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2019);
see alsoJessica Stillman, Learn How Airlines Set Their Prices(So You Can Get
a Better Deal), INC. (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.inc.com/jessica-stillman/learnhow-airlines-set-their-prices-so-you-can-get-a-better-deal.html.
Lawrence R. Weatherford & Samuel E. Bodily, A Taxonomy and Re3
search Overview of Perishable-Asset Revenue Management: Yield Management, Overbooking, and Pricing,40 OPERATIONS RES. 831, 832 (1992).
30 ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION,

31 ALGORITHMS AND COLLUSION, supra note

36

Id
288
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algorithms-are generally unknown,"3 especially for self-learning
algorithms. A few factors are apparent. First, airlines segment their
prices by charging passenger groups different prices, depending on
their willingness to pay more or less. 38 For example, airlines will
charge business people more because they often wait until the last
minute to book their ticket. 39 Second, airlines will vary their airfare
depending on the flight's time of day and week.40 Lastly, airlines
will vary their airfares depending on the particular route a passenger takes-whether it is a direct route, to or from a busy airport,
etc."
The airline industry is on the forefront of artificial intelligence, pricing algorithms, and dynamic pricing. Because it is an
international industry, the pricing factors can change in a matter
of seconds. Therefore, fast-paced robo-sellers in the airline industry have become the norm.42 Pricing algorithms are instantaneous,
with an ever-growing ability to process large amounts of data and
quickly learn from their mistakes. 3 Airlines that implement dynamic pricing have seen $200 million to $500 million increases in
revenue." As you can see, airlines would be crazy not to use dynamic pricing and pricing algorithms. However, there are negative
perceptions of dynamic pricing in the airline industry. Dynamic
pricing allows airlines to charge higher prices to less price-sensitive, business individuals and lower prices to more 'price-sensitive

3' Sara Robinson, Computer Scientists Find Unexpected Depths in Airfare
Search Problem, 35 SIAM NEWs, July-Aug. 2002, at 1, 1 (discussing artificial
intelligence students at MIT who attempted to decode airline pricing algorithms
in order to find the cheapest flights but called it "unsolvable."). For economic
studies that attempt to decipher airline pricing, see Kevin R. Williams, Dynamic
Airline Pricingand SeatAvailability COWLES FOUND. FOR RES. IN ECON., No.
2103U, Feb. 2018, at 1; see also Beat Burger & Matthias Fuchs, Dynamics Pricing - a FutureAirline Business Model, 4 J. REVENUE & PRICING MGMT. 39
(2004).
38

Magloff, supranote 34.

Magloff, supranote 34.
40 Magloff, supranote 34.
39

41

Magloff, supranote 34.

4 See Diego Escobari, Dynamic Pricing, Advance Sales andAggregate Demand Learningin Airlines, 60 J. INDUS. ECONS. 697 (2012).
as See Ezrachi & Stucke, supra note 25; see also ALGORITHMS AND
COLLUSION, supranote 17.
" Michael P. Schubmehl, Wesley M. Turner & Daniel M. Boylan, Models
for EvaluatingAirline Overbooking, 23 UMAP J. 301, 316 (2002).
289
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individuals,' such as students or the elderly.45 Airline passengers,
however, often become irked when they realize they paid more for
a ticket then someone they are sitting next to.46 The same row, same
airline, same bag of peanuts and drink, yet the airfare is different. 47
Regardless, airlines are utilizing this technology, and if a consumer
is looking to travel by air, they have very few options.
III.

THE LEGAL COMPOSITION

The Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") Act are the 'core federal antitrust laws.' 48 These
laws create the general framework for deterring anti-competitive
business decisions. 49 The objective of antitrust laws has always
been "to protect the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure there are strong incentives for businesses to
operate efficiently, keep prices down, and keep quality up."5 0 This

.

a See Kelly L. Haws & William O. Bearden, Dynamic Pricingand Consumer FairnessPerceptions, 33 J. CONSUMER REs. 304 (2006)
46 Weiss & Mehrotra, supranote 26, 1 19; see also Haws & Bearden, supra
note 45 (examining dynamic pricing and how consumers perceive the idea of

price discrimination).

47 One consumer paying a higher price than another consumer for an identical product would constitute price discrimination. Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012), price discrimination is illegal in certain contexts.
Airlines seem to be pricing discriminatorily, which would provide the government with an avenue to regulate airlines' pricing algorithms. However, the Robinson-Patman Act is confined to regulating commodities. Courts have construed
that to exclude services, like airfare. Fleetway, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Interstate
Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3rd Cir. 1934) (deciding transportation by bus is not a
"commodity" under the Robinson-Patman Act); Gen. Shale Products Corp. v.
Struck Constr. Co., 132 F.2d 425 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 780 (1943)
(deciding a construction contract that included labor and work was not a "commodity" under the Robinson-Patman Act); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v. Pittsburgh
Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Ctr., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400, 403 (W.D.
Pa. 1963) (defining the sale of a "commodity" as a transfer of chattel or personal
property). Therefore, airlines are likely free from any Robinson-Patman violations.
48 FED. TRADE COMM'N, The Antitrust Laws [hereinafter Antitrust Laws],
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
49

so5

Id

d
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Part analyzes the Sherman Act in detail and briefly discusses the
Clayton and FTC Acts.
A. The Sherman Act
In the business context, the words "monopoly" and "pricefixing" have negative connotations because of their implications
for consumers.5 Before 1890, businesses and individuals who possessed wealth were merging together in an attempt to gain monopolistic power.5 2 The natural result of this business maneuver was
to fix prices in order to maximize profits.53 The federal government
recognized this injustice and passed the Sherman Act in 1890 as a
means to outlaw "every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States," and punish any person who "shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ...
any part of the trade or
4
commerce among the several States." By its own nature, a pricing
algorithm could violate the Sherman Act by price fixing, colluding,
and creating horizontal agreements. 5

s1 See Laurel A. Rigertas, The LegalProfession'sMonopoly: Failingto Pro-

tect Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2683 (2014) (discussing a monopoly in the
legal profession and how it harms consumers); see also Nicole Manuel, How
Does a Monopoly Affect Business and Consumers?, CHRON (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://smallbusiness.chron.com/monopoly-affect-business-consumers70033.html.
51 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 (1911).
3 Id. at 33.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012).
"s Pricing algorithms can be subject to several violations under the Sherman
Act. However, those violations will not be addressed here. One violation is creating or maintaining a monopoly. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, Monopolization
Defined,
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined (last visited Jan. 7,
2019); see also Eugene V. Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Poweror
Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REV. 745 (1949). Another violation is price discriminating.
See M. A. Adelman, PriceDiscriminationas Treated in the Attorney General's
Report 104 U. PA. L. REV. 222 (1955); see also Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T.
Kudrle, The Law and Economics of Price Discriminationin Modern Economics: Time for Reconciliation?,43 U.C. DAvIS L. REV: 1235 (2010). Another violation is restraining the market. See Robert H. Jerry, II & Donald E Knebel,
291
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Price Fixing and Collusion

The Supreme Court has stated that price fixing not only includes "an agreement to pay or charge rigid, uniform prices," but
also fixed pricing ranges, fixed pricing levels of ascending or descending scales, or prices that are fixed through a formula-"[t]hey
6
are fixed because they are agreed upon." Under Section One of
the Sherman Act, horizontal agreements-agreements on price or
other trade terms between competitors-are so harmful that they
are perse unlawful.' 7 Courts presume that a horizontal agreement,
or agreement to fix prices, has a negative effect on competition,
which relieves a potential antitrust plaintiff of its burden to show
a negative impact.5 8 As a result, the plaintiff needs to prove only
the existence of an agreement.59 The agreement can be explicit or
implicit.60 Because the agreement is the sole element in a per se
horizontal-agreement claim, it is discussed in-depth in Section
III(a)(ii).
Price fixing negatively affects the market, even if the prices
are reasonable. 61 If parties set prices that are reasonable today, they
will likely set prices that are unreasonable in the future due to lack
of supervision. 62 This would leave the parties in a dominant mar63
ket position where they. could destroy the competitive system.
Even if 'reasonable price fixing' does not lead to a monopoly, it
would "interfere with the free play of market forces."64 As a result,
reasonableness cannot negate liability for price fixing or any other
Antitrust and Employer Restraints in Labor Markets, 6 INDUS. REL. L.J. 173
(1984).
56 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940).
s George A.. Hay, Horizontal Agreements: Concept and Proof, 51
ANTITRUST BULL. 877, 879 n.5 (2006) (discussing that vertical agreementsagreements between manufacturers and their distributors-are prosecuted under section 1 of the Sherman Act, but are not always evaluated under the per se

illegality standard); see also United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S.
333, 337 (1969).
58 Hay, supra note 57, at 877.

59 Id.
60 Am. Tobacco Co v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946); Hay, supra
note 57, at 878.
61 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
62

Id

63

Id

64

Id
292
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per se horizontal agreement under Section One of the Sherman Act
if an agreement exists.6 5
2. Proving the Existence of a Horizontal Agreement
A horizonal agreement is an agreement between competing
entities on price or other terms of trade.6 6 If two competing entities
(e.g., American Airlines and Delta Air Lines) come to an agreement
to price their international flights at the same price, then they have
formed a horizontal agreement. For example, in 2007, British Airways pled guilty to fixing prices for its international flights.6 7 British Airways pled that its representatives met with representatives
of a competing airline and agreed to fix the passenger fuel surcharge for international flights between the United States and
United Kingdom. 68 That agreement is a horizonal agreement. As
discussed earlier, in a per se horizontal agreement case, a plaintiff
can prevail by showing the existence of an agreement between the
allegedly liable parties. 69 There are two types of agreements: explicit and tacit.
B. ExplicitAgreements
The easiest way to establish an agreement is through an explicit agreement. Explicit agreements are written letters, in-person
agreements, or any other means of oral communication (e.g., telephone) where parties decide to incrementally raise prices together. 70 In all of these situations, courts condemn and find no legitimate reason for competitors to discuss pricing together."
Additionally, communication among parties can be through a
third-party channel. An example of a third-party horizontal agreement is a "hub and spoke" agreement, where the third-party individually conveys the willingness of several competitors to

Antitrust Laws, supranote 48.
Hay, supranote 57, at 877.
67 See United States v. British Airways PLC, Criminal No. 07-183 JDB
(D.C.C. 2007) (plea agreement), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/plea-agreement-44.
68 Id
69 Hay, supra note 57, at
877.
65

66

70

"

Id. at 880.
Id. at 881.
293
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participate in anticompetitive conduct.72 Plaintiffs have a choice of
direct and circumstantial evidence to establish an explicit agreement.
1. Evidence
There are two types of evidence that parties could potentially use to prove, or disprove, an explicit agreement. First, direct
evidence-written communications, emails, recorded phone calls,
etc.-is the easier way to evidence an explicit agreement. 3 The second, and more controversial type of evidence is circumstantial evidence.7 4 When no direct evidence exists, fact-finders may rely on
circumstantial evidence.75 Generally, parallel prices must accompany other 'plus factors' in order for a fact-finder to use circumstantial evidence to infer an explicit agreement. 76 Cases tend to be
fact specific, but courts have identified the following non-exhaustive plus factors.
The first plus factor (and most used) is whether it would be
economicallyplausiblefor the defendants to reach an agreement."
In MatsushitaElectricIndustries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., Japanese manufacturers allegedly sold consumer electronic products
("CEP") at a below-market rate in the United States in order to
obtain a monopoly and eventually raise prices above the market
rate. 8 The plaintiff presented circumstantial evidence that pointed
72

Id. at 882; see also Interstate Circuit v. United States; 306 U.S. 208 (1939)

(discussing an example of a "hub and spoke" case where a party who owned a
chain of theaters sought to have the film suppliers impose harsh restrictions on
smaller theater chains; however, the court established that the suppliers in question would not have imposed the restrictions unless they were assured that the
other suppliers would also impose the restrictions; therefore, the owner of the
chain of theaters took on the role of the "hub," or third-party intermediary, and
the suppliers took on the role of the "spokes.").
" Hay, supranote 57, at 883.

Id.
" Id
76 Id at 883-84; see also Michael D. Blechman, ConsciousParallelism,Sig7

nalingandFacilitatingDevices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under the AntitrustLaws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 881 (1979).
" Dean Harvey, Anticompetitive Social Norms as Antitrust Violations, 94
CALIF. L. REv. 769, 775 (2006).
78

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

(1986).
294
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to a reasonable inference that the defendant attempted to monopolize the United States CEP market in violation of the Sherman
Act." However, the Supreme Court found that the defendants' alleged predatory pricing scheme was economically implausible. 80
The Court reasoned that if the defendants were selling their products at below-cost in order to gain a monopoly, then they must reasonably believe that they can make up for their losses in the longterm.8 1 However, once the defendants attained a monopoly and
subsequently raised prices, other firms would enter the market,
leaving the defendants with the losses they amounted through their
attempted monopoly.82
The second plus factor is whether there were opportunities
for collusion.83 For example, if the alleged competing parties had
frequent phone conversations with no plausible excuse, or if the
parties attended the same convention. 84 There needs to be an opportunity for the collusion to take place. The third plus factor is
the coincidencefactor-if the nature of the market is such that an
identical price would be unlikely without a previous agreement. 85
The last plus factor looks at the behavior of the parties and attempts to show that the alleged anticompetitive actions could not
have arisen through independent decision-making. 86
2. The Oligopoly Defense
A defendant can combat parallel pricing allegations by asserting the oligopoly defense,87 which is particularly relevant to this
Article because of the oligopoly nature of the airline industry. The

79 Id. at 580 (Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found these inferences
reasonable and overturned the district court's summary judgment ruling).
80
81

82

Id. at 595.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 592.

Einer Elhauge, Harvard, Not Chicago: Which Antitrust School Drives
Recent Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, No. 2, 2007,
at 1, 10.
84 Hay, supra note 57, at
886.
83

85

Id. at 886.

86 Id. at 887.
87 Id. at 888; see also Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71
ANTITRUST

L.J. 719 (2004) (discussing the oligopoly market's heightened ability

to collude).
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oligopoly defense is best understood through an example. 88 There
are two fruit stands in a town, stand A and B, each providing the
same quality of fruit. The consumers have no brand loyalty. The
competitive market price for an apple is one dollar, and if each
stand charges that rate, each business will have equal apple revenue. Both stands will post their apple price outside of their stores
for consumers. Therefore, the other stand will see the price. If
stand A raises its rate to two dollars-well above the market ratestand B has two options. First, stand B can leave its rate at one
dollar and absorb the excess business that will flow over as a result
of stand A's price increase. Second, stand B can raise its price, forcing consumers to purchase apples at the two-dollar rate. At first
glance, this seems identical to the two stand owners meeting and
decided to fix the rate at two dollars. However, the price increase
stems from "[t]he very nature of their market: only a few firms exist, barriers to entry are high, prices are very visible, and there is
no chance.for one rival, by maintaining a low price, permanently
to lock up any significant chunk of business."8 9
Does it not seem counter-intuitive to allow the two stands,
through observing each other's prices, to set a price well above the
market rate? Is the injury to the consumer, or the gain to the
stands, any different than if the two stands signed an agreement
that set the price above the competitive price?
C. Tacit (Implicit)Agreements
"It is not a novel conspiracy doctrine to say that [an] agreeif there is
ment can be signified by actions as well as words ...
agreement in the legal sense, the agreement seems inescapably an
unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade."90 However, an oligopoly
firm, like the apple-stand example,91 is using its competitors' pricing as another factor to establish its profit-maximizing rate-something competitors in a large market regularly do. 92 In the hypothetical apple-stand market, if stand A lowers its apple price in half,

88

This example of an oligopoly defense is an adapted version of an example

provided by Professor George Hay. Hay, supra note 57, at 888-90.
89 Id. at 890.
90 Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:

Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 665 (1962).
91 See supra Section I(A)(2)(a)(ii).
92 Turner, supra note 90, at 665.
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and stand B does not factor that price-cut into its pricing decision,
then stand B would lose half of its apple sales. 93 On the other hand,
a seller in a highly populated market is not as likely to react to a
price cut because if one seller lowers its price, the market evenly.
distributes the loss of sales over all sellers." This theory is known
as oligopolistic interdependence-American law does not draw a
distinction between this and tacit collusion. 95 However, there is still
ambiguity around what a tacit agreement is, and if it can be evidence of an agreement under Section One of the Sherman Act.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court said
that "'[t]he crucial question' is whether the challenged anticompetitive conduct 'stem[s] from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.'"96 A plain-language reading of this statement indicates that a party could establish a Sherman Act (Section
One) agreement through a tacit agreement. Many, however, disagree with this reading of Twombly.9 7 The result of Twombly was
that a tacit agreement could be found where "coordination [was]
something more than mere interdependence" but did not indicate
what more was needed. 98 But the Court did say that parallel conduct would be insufficient without circumstances that demonstrate
a meeting of the minds. 99 Post- Twombly courts vary on defining a
tacit agreement.1 00 "A tacit agreement is better understood as one
in which rivals communicate their intentions in language without

93

Id

94

Id

William H. Page, Tacit Agreement Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
81 ANTITRUST L.J. 593, 595 n.12 (2017).
95

96

Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553 (2007) (emphasis added)

(quoting Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537,

540 (1954)).
9 Page, supra note 95, at 596-98, 604 (discussing that Judge Cecilia Altonaga in the Southern District of Florida believes the Supreme Court mistakenly put 'tacit' there; Judge J. Lumbard on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
despises the use of 'tacit agreement'; Judge Posner on the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals claims that 'tacit agreements' do not violate antitrust laws; and several other scholarly writers have the same negative opinion of tacit agreements).
98 Id at 602.
99

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.

100 Page, supranote 95, at 605-06 (explaining the 11th Circuit Court of Appeal would rule without defining the difference between express and tacit; 8th
Circuit Court of Appeals differentiates express and tacit by saying the former is
oral or written and the latter is nonverbal agreements (i.e., gestures)).
297

Loyola ConsumerLaw Re view

[V ol. 3 2:2

forming a complete agreement, but then indicate their assent to the
suggested course of action by subsequent interdependent pricing
or other competitive actions." 10 1 This definition of a tacit agreement is ambiguous but, for the purposes of this Article, it will suffice. 10 2
D. The Clayton Act andFederalTrade Commission Act
In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton and FTC Acts. 0 The
Clayton and FTC Act are the two remaining laws that make up
the "core federal antitrust laws." 4 The discussion of these laws
will touch only on their relevant areas, as the Sherman Act is the
most prevalent law in the scope of this Article.
The Clayton Act "[w]as intended for the protection of the
public against the evils which were supposed to flow from the undue lessening of competition." 10 5 Congress enacted the Clayton Act
to "[r]each specific conduct which had been held by the courts to
be outside the ambit of the Sherman Act and which Congress felt
must be proscribed in order to promote competition."1 06 Congress
amended the Clayton Act to include additional, anti-competitive
actions which Congress deemed dangerous to consumers. 0 7 Additionally, the Clayton Act enables private parties to sue for treble
damages-triple damages-for violations under the Clayton Act
and the Sherman Act.1 08 Treble damage eligibility hinges on
whether the injured party alleges and proves "(1) [v]iolation by

10' Id at 607.
For additional materials that discuss tacit agreements, see William E.
Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors
andAgreementin AntitrustLaw, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393 (2011); see alsoMichael
K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelismand Price Fixing: Defining the Boundary, 52
U. CHI. L. REv. 508 (1985); see also Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of HorizontalAgreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 683 (2011).
... Antitrust Laws, supranote 48.
102

104

Id

105 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 280 U.S. 291, 297-98 (1930).
106

McElhenney Co. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 337 (4th Cir.

1959); see also Antitrust Laws, supra note 45 (providing examples of what the
Clayton Act regulates-anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions and interlocking directorates).
` Antitrust Laws, supranote 48 (amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in
1936 and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act in 1976).
108

Id See also 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
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defendant of an antitrust law, (2) an ascertainable injury to plaintiff's business or property which is reducible to money damages,
and (3) a causal connection between the violation and the in-

jury. "109
The FTC Act created a commission that can investigate
and bring claims under the Act." All violations of the Sherman
Act also violate the FTC Act. 11' Additionally, the FTC Act includes claims for some activities outside of the Sherman Act's
scope. 1 2 This Article provides two methods in which the FTC
could potentially regulate the airline industry's use of pricing algorithms.11 3 These recommendations make a few characteristics of
the FTC Act particularly relevant. First, Section Five of the FTC
Act gives the commission jurisdiction, among other things, over
"unfair . .. acts or practices in or affecting commerce.""1 4 The Supreme Court has identified three factors for analyzing alleged unfair acts under the FTC Act: whether the act (1) causes substantial
injury to consumers; (2) is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) offends public policy." 5 Second, the FTC has
vocalized its opinion on how big-data companies need to be regulated. 116 This is relevant because pricing algorithms need large
amounts of data to operate.
IV.

THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY'S HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST DISPUTES

Have you ever wondered how the price of an airline ticket
can change in a matter of a days, hours, minutes, or even seconds?
American Airlines, one of the largest airlines in the world, changes
109 James H. Watz, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: The Private Plaintiff's
Remedies, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 333, 338 (1966).
" AntitrustLaws, supranote 48.

" 1Id
112Id

See infra Section IV(b)(ii).
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012) ("Unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,
are hereby declared unlawful.").
1s Fed Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5
(1972).
113
114

&

116 See EDITH RAMIREZ, JULIE BRILL, MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN
TERRELL McSWEENY, FED. TRADE COMM'N, BIG DATA: A TOOL FOR
INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION? (2016).
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500,000 prices per day.1" They, and most other airlines, do so
through dynamic pricing-or yield management.1 18 Occasionally,
airlines lose control of their dynamic pricing system to their own
detriment. In 2013, for example, the United Airlines booking system malfunctioned and priced tickets at ultra-low prices-including a $5 round-trip ticket from New York to Houston and a $2.50
one-way ticket from Washington, D.C. to Austin, Texas." 9 The
negative results of losing control of a pricing algorithm's dynamic
pricing system can be exacerbated in an oligopoly market. 2 0 Before
examining the airline industry's pricing techniques and market
structure, I will discuss some history of antitrust litigation involving airlines.
A. Airlines'Bad History with Sherman (the Act)
The airline industry has not always been a 'free' market.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 gave the airline regulation
reigns to the Civil Authority Board-later reorganized as the Civil
Aeronautics Board ("CAB").12 1 The CAB regulated the passengerairlines industry for a significant portion of history; controlling
things like which airlines could operate in a market, the routes that
"7 R. Preston McAfee & Vera te Velde, Dynamic Pricingin the Airline Inhttps//mcafee.cc/PaTECH.,
INST.
CAL.
dustry,
pers/PDF/DynamicPriceDiscrimination.pdf
"8 For additional resources on dynamic pricing, see Ahmad Faruqui, Ryan
Hledik & John Tsoukalis, The Power of Dynamic Pricing, 22 ELECTRICITY J.
42 (2009) (discussing dynamic pricing in the electricity industry); see also Indre
Deksnyte & Zigmas Lydeka, DynamicPricingandIts FormingFactors, 3 INT'L
J. Bus. & Soc. SCI. 213 (2012) (discussing dynamic pricing and factors that are
commonly used); Rainer Schmidt, Michael M6hring -& Barbara Keller, Design
of Dynamic Pricing Systems for Online-Retailer's-CoreFunctionalities and
Qualitative Insight, MEDITERRANEAN CoNF. ON INFO. SYSS., Sept. 2016, at 1
(examining how dynamic pricing functions in the online retail industry).
"' Hugo Martin, Glitch Causes United to Sell Tickets for as Little as $2.50,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/12/business/lafi-mo-glitch-causes-united-to-sells-tickets-for-as-little-as-250-20130912; see also
Alex Hern, UnitedAirlines Cancels Thousands of Bargain Tickets Sold in Pricing Glitch, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2015, 5:02 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/12/united-airlines-cancels-bargain-tickets-pricing-glitch.
12 See supra Section IV(B)(1).
121 Gerald N. Cook, A Review of History, Structure, and Competitionin the
US. Airline Industry, 7 J. AVIATION/AEROSPACE EDUC. & RES. 33, 33 (1996).
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each airline had control of, ticket rates, and maximum airplane capacities. 2 2 These regulations hindered competition in the industry,
which in turn hurt consumers. As a result, President Carter signed
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.123 Proponents of deregulation
argued that a competitive market would not be prone to monopoly
(or oligopoly) dangers because large airlines would have to price
competitively or be subject to other airlines entering the market
with lower prices.1 2 4 Deregulation, however, had the opposite effect. Large airlines controlled a majority of the incoming and outgoing flights from 'hub' airports,125 giving the resemblance of a
monopoly (or oligopoly).' 2 6 All of a sudden, the airline industry was
in the purview of federal antitrust laws.
Without regulations, airlines now have much more freedom
to operate as they wish. This backfired in the early twenty-first
century. A group of plaintiffs, freight and passenger consumers,
brought a class action lawsuit against Lufthansa Airlines, Air Canada, Air France, and many other airlines for inflating prices.127 The
airlines, "through regular and intricate coordination . .. jointly
raised and maintained prices, eliminated discounting, allocated
markets (of customers, routes and territories), restricted supply,
and levied new, artificially inflated surcharges, particularly fuel
surcharges."12 8 The settlement agreement was $278 million in

122 Id at 34.

David G. Monk, The Lessons of Airline Regulation and Deregulation:
Will We Make the Same Mistakesin Space?, 57 J. AIRL. & CoM. 715, 721 (1992).
123

124 Paul Stephen Dempsey, Airline DeregulationandLaissez-FaireMythology: Economic Theoryin Turbulence, 56 J. AIR L. & CoM. 305, 314-17 (1990).
125 'Hub' airports are large airports, located in large cities, where a large
volume of flights go in and out. For example, Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, Chicago O'Hare, Los Angeles International Airport, and Denver International Airport. John Elledge, What is a Hub Airport and Why Should You Want One?,
CITYMETRIC (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.citymetric.com/what-hub-airportand-why-should-you-want-one-100.
126 Dempsey, supra note 184, at 333-34.
127 In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06-MD-1775, 2015

&

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138479 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2015); see also JOSHUA P. DAVIS

ROBERT H. LANDE, SUMMARIES OF TWENTY CASES OF SUCCESSFUL PRIVATE
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT,
18

U. S.F. SCH. L., No. 2013-01, § 2.

DAVIS & LANDE, supra note 187, § 2(A).
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damages.1 29 This case is a small sample of the times the government
and private parties have pursued airlines for antitrust violations."'
In another example, the DOJ pursued the major U.S. airlines 13 ' and the Airline Tariff Publishing Company ("ATPCO"). 3 2
The ATPCO case is particularly relevant to this Article because
the case raised antitrust issues relating to price announcements in
technology. 3 3 ATPCO was the central clearinghouse for airline
pricing. 3 4 Airlines sent ATPCO their new fares to be added, old
fares to be removed, and changes to existing fares. 3 s ATPCO then
compiled all of the information and sent it back to the major airlines and to the computer reservation systems ("CRS") in the
United States-Sabre, Worldspan, System One, and Apollo. 136 The
CRSs then made the information available to consumers, travel
agents, and other airlines."' One characteristic of the fare that
129

Id

§

2

There is a pending lawsuit in the Unites States District Court for the District of Columbia against four major U.S. airlines (United Airlines, American
Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and Delta Air Lines) for conspiring to limit the
number of new seats available on flights in order to raise airfare. Hugo Martin,
Antitrust Suit AgainstAirlines CanMove Ahead, JudgeSays, L.A. TIMES (Nov.
5, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-travel-briefcase-antitrust-20161105-story.html. Southwest Airlines settled and agreed to cooperate
for $15 million. Jonathan Stempel, Southwest Airlines to Pay$15Million to Settle Price Collusion Lawsui4 REUTERS (Jan. 4, 2018, 6:40 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southwest-settlement/southwest-airlines-to-pay-15-millionto-settle-price-collusion-lawsuit-idUSKBN1EU02F. Later, American Airlines
settled and agreed to cooperate (even though American still denies any illegal
acts) for $45 million. American Airlines to Pay $45 Million to End Consumer
http://for2018),
16,
(June
FORTUNE
Lawsuit,
Antitrust
130

tune.com/2018/06/16/american-airlines-lawsuit/.
131 The eight airlines were Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, Continental
Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Northwest Airlines, Trans World Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways. Severin Borenstein, Rapid Price Communication and
Coordination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case, ANTITRUST REVOLUTION
310, 314 n.2 (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White eds., 3rd ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 1999).
132 See United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.C.C.
1993).
133 Borenstein, supranote 191, at 310.
134 Id at 310-11.
13s Id
at 312.
136

Id

137 Id
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airlines sent to ATPCO is the first and last ticket dates-the
timeframe of when the airline would offer a particular fare.1 38 The
DOJ investigation revealed that airlines were setting first andlast
ticket dates weeks in advance and competing airlines would price
their airfare identically for the respective timeframes.1 39
The DOJ alleged that the airlines used fare basis codes and
footnote designators 4 0 to negotiate fares for certain routes."14 All of
the parties settled with the DOJ and agreed to: (1) only use fare
basis codes and footnote designators for basic information, (2) not
link fares with certain codes, and (3) not pre-announce price increases, with the exception of widely publicized sales.14 2 The alleged agreement-or meeting of the minds-was an express agreement, hidden within technology. The facts of the ATPCO case
provide a framework for analyzing situations where an airline's
pricing algorithm could potentially be subject to antitrust violations,

B. Should We WorryAbout an Oligopoly Airline Industry?
Proponents of the Deregulation Act of 1978 argued that it
would turn the airline industry "hotly competitive."14 3 In the shortrun, the market acted as proponents expected-more than one
hundred and twenty new airlines opened."4 Today, however, four
airlines-United Airlines, American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, and
Southwest Airlines-control 80% to 84% of America's consumer
air travel." 5 This is largely the result of airlines merging together

18

Id at 313.

Algorithms and Collusion, supranote 17, at 30.
'" The fare basis codes and footnote designators are information that was
included in the fare information that airlines would send to ATPCO, who would
then forward it to the CRS, who would then publish the information. Borenstein, supranote 191, at 313.
141 Id
at 316 (providing an example of how the DOJ described the negotiations).
142 Id at 325.
143 Dempsey, supra note 184, at 323.
1

Leanna Garfield, The United Airlines Boycott Is Not Backing down

-

141

Here's How It Could Affect Sales, Bus. Insider (Apr. 18, 2017, 11:55 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/united-airlines-scandal-boycott-sales-2 017-4;
see also Christopher Drew, Airlines Under Justice Dept. Investigation over
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in order to obtain a larger market share. 14 6 An oligopoly market
consists of "a small number of organizations or companies [that
have] control of an area of business.""' Four companies controlling
an upward of 84% of a market seems to fit that definition, right?
The airline industry is arguably (or maybe clearly) an oligopoly."'
The industry has maintained an oligopoly because of barriers to
entry. First, there are few available slots at the major airports for
a new airline to operate. 4 9 Second, United Airlines and American
Airlines own the two largest CRSs; therefore, new airlines end up
affiliating with the larger airlines to gain access to their CRS.'5 0

https://www.ny(July 1, 2015),
Possible Collusion, N.Y. Times
times.com/2015/07/02/business/airlines-under-justice-dept-investigation-overpossible-collusion.html?_r=0.
146 In 2005, US Airways merged with American West Airlines; in 2008, Delta
Air Lines merged with Northwest Airlines; in 2010, United Airlines merged with
Continental Airlines; in 2011, Southwest Airlines merged with AirTran Airways; and in 2013, American Airlines merged with US Airways. HowM&A Has
Driven the Consolidation of the US Airline Industry over the Last Decade?,
Forbes (May 4, 2016, 8:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/05/04/how-ma-has-driven-the-consolidation-of-the-us-airline-industry-over-the-last-decade/#6e32a6e92bba. In 1990, 2000, 2010, and 2015, the
market share of the four largest airlines have gradually changed from 68%, to
61%, to 65%, to 84%, respectively. Id.
https://dictionary.camDICTIONARY,
CAMBRIDGE
141 Oligopoly,
bridge.org/dictionary/english/oligopoly (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
141 See Xander Prijs, Oligopoly in the Sky, RISK MAG. (May 9, 2017),
(arguing that
https://riskmagazine.nl/article/2017-02-09-oligopoly-in-the-sky
airlines treat their customers badly because of the oligopoly market structure);
see also A Lack of Competition Explains the Flaws in American A viation,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/04/22/alack-of-competition-explains-the-flaws-in-american-aviation (explaining that
Warren Buffet believes the airline industry is an oligopoly).
149 Amy Hunt, Assault on the Airline Industry: PrivateLitigation and the
ProblemofSettlemen4 59 J. AIR L. & CoM. 983, 992 (1994). 68% of United States
airports have no gates to lease to new airlines. PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY,
FLYING BLIND: THE FAILURE OF DEREGULATION 21 (Econ. Policy Inst. 1990)

[hereinafter PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY]. When large airlines lease airport gates
to new airlines, they can charge them absurd amounts.-Northwest Airlines
charged Southwest Airlines eighteen times what they paid to lease a gate at the
Detroit Airport. Id.
"o PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, supra note 209, at 22 (examples include
United Express, American Eagle, and Continental Express); but see Andrew N.
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Third, consumers build brand loyalty through airlines' frequent
flyer programs and often stick with that airline to maximize their
rewards."" These impediments to enter the airline market have led
to the oligopolistic look the airline industry now maintains.
When companies operate in a monopoly or oligopoly market, they can offer a subpar good or service and the lack of competition (or other purchasing options) forces consumers to return to
the subpar good or service. A pertinent example of this is United
Airlines. United Airlines overbooked a flight leaving Chicago
O'Hare Airport and forcibly removed a man from the plane." Because United Airlines is one of the four major airlines that are responsible for the majority of flights in the United States, travelers
are forced to fly with them at whatever price they demand (or take
the inconvenient route and drive).' This 'damned if I do, damned
if I do not' decision leaves consumers with a feeling of being
wronged by the airline industry. The transportation industry is essential to the economic and social structure of any community."'
For example, if a community does not have convenient access to
airline services, they are unlikely to retain and attract new businesses. Therefore, the airline industry is in a position of power over
communities that are seeking to improve the lives of their citizens.
Kleit, Computer Reservation Systems: Competition Misunderstood, 37
ANTITRUST BULL. 833 (1992).
" PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY,

supra note 209, at

22.

Avi Selk, A Man Wouldn't Leave an Overbooked UnitedFlight. So He
Was Dragged off; Battered and Limp, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2017/04/10/a-manwouldnt-leave-an-overbooked-united-flight-so-he-was-dragged-off-batteredand-limp/?utm_term=.878826f56231.
153 See Alex Pareene, Airlines Can Treat You Like GarbageBecause They
152

are an Oligopoly,

SPLINTER

(Apr.

11, 2017,

9:33 AM), https://splin-

ternews.com/airlines-can-treat-you-like-garbage-because-they-are-an1794192270; see also James Downie, Beyond United: How Oligopolies Hurt
Americans' Pocketbooks, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2017/04/12/beyond-united-how-oligopolies-hurt-americans-pocketbooks/?utm_term=.ca5610c2fbe7;
Mark
Orton,
United Airlines, Monopoly/Oligopoly, the Natural Laws of Capitalism,
MEDIUM (Apr. 17, 2017), https://medium.com/@markorton93/united-airlinesmonopoly-oligopoly-the-natural-laws-of-capitalism-c0d928641b94.
154

See NAT'L BUS. COALITION FOR RAPID TRANSIT, THE ECONOMIC

IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC TRANSIT (2003); see also Thomas J. Goldsby et al., The

CriticalRole of Transportationin Business and the Economy, INFORMIT (Feb.
7, 2014), http://www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2171313.
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The issue is magnified because the airline industry is an oligopoly."I "Unregulated monopolies or oligopolies in the transportation
industry can reduce quality and service while holding up prices or
pricing discriminately because of limited access through hubs."'
Whether the airline oligopoly is truly bad for consumers or not,
pricing algorithms will only intensify the issue. Both the airline industry and government regulators need to be aware of what is
coming.
V.

PRICING ALGORITHMS FACE-OFF WITH
ANTITRUST LAWS

Algorithms allow businesses to remove human decisionmaking from their daily operations. It follows then that this increase in machine decision-making should also remove the human
temptation to collude in order to gain a competitive advantage,
right? Not necessarily. This Part will discuss litigation-past and
future-involving pricing algorithms and how pricing algorithms
affect an oligopoly market.
A. PricingAlgorithms in Court
Regulating algorithms to ensure compliance with competition laws extends beyond the borders of the United States. The
United Kingdom's Competition and Markets Authority coordinated with the United States in the Topkins investigation."' In response to Lufthansa Airline's spike in pricing on domestic flights
shortly after Air Berlin went bankrupt, president of Germany's
Federal Cartel Office, Andreas Mundt, stated that "companies
[cannot] hide behind pricing algorithms" and "algorithms [are not]

155

Monk, supra note 183, at 725; see also Melvin Brenner, Airline Deregu-

lation-a Case Study in Public Policy Failure, 16 TRANSP. L.J. 179, 189 (1988)
(discussing the potential impact of a concentration of service providers in the
airline industry).
156 Monk, supra note 183, at 731.
"51 Michelle A. Mantine & Karl Herrmann, Agreements andAlgorithmsCan
Add up to Antitrust Liability, REEDSMITH (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.globalregulatoryenforcementlawblog.com/2 018/10/articles/antitrust-competition/agreements-and-algorithms-can-add-up-to-antitrust-liability/?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium =syndication&utmcampaign=ViewOriginal.
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written by dear God in heaven".'158 The European Commissioner
for Competition, Margrethe Vestger, stated that even though automated dynamic pricing programs cannot come to a "meeting of the
minds," that does not mean the software cannot make agreements
on behalf of humans.1 19 Vestger proposed that businesses incorporate ethical- guidelines into the pricing algorithms' code and take
responsibility for the technology they opt to use.'6 0 Pricing algorithms provide clear benefits to businesses everywhere in the
world, but the benefits come with the responsibility of ensuring the
pricing program is abiding by antitrust laws.
The DOJ has made it apparent that it is committed to a free
and fair marketplace, even on the internet. 6 ' In 2015, the DOJ
identified, investigated, and charged its first pricing-algorithm culprit with anticompetitive acts.6 2 David Topkins plead guilty to fixing prices in violation of federal antitrust laws.1 63 Topkins and his
co-conspirators agreed to fix, increase, and maintain the prices of
their posters sold on Amazon.1 64 The competitors agreed to adopt
a pricing algorithm-which Topkins manufactured-with the
goal of coordinating their price changes. 6 5 In furtherance of the
agreement, Topkins and his co-conspirators exchanged information to ensure the parties were adhering to the agreement.1 66 An
identical set of facts-defendants fixing poster prices online via a
pricing algorithm-arose in the same year and led to a similar plea
German competition watchdog slams Lufthansa over 'algorithm'price
hikes on flights, STRAIGHT TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017, 6:37 PM), https://www.straitstimes.com/world/europe/german-competition-watchdog-slams-lufthansaover-algorithm-price-hikes-on-flights.
159 Margrethe Vestager, Algorithms and Competition, Address at the Bundeskartellamt 18th Conference on Competition (Mar. 16, 2017).
160 Id
161 Press Release, Dep't of Justice, FormerE-Commerce Executive
Charged
with PriceFixingin the Antitrust Division'sFirstOnline MarketplaceProsecution (April 6, 2015)(on file with the author), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-e-commerce-executive-charged-price-fixing-antitrust-divisions-firstonline-marketplace.
162 See Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Topkins, No. CR 15-00201
WHO (N.D. Cal. April 30, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/plea-agreement-462.
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agreement. 167 These two cases clearly show that when two parties
agree to abide by a pricing algorithm, they are in violation of federal antitrust laws.1 68 However, as algorithms advance, cases will
not be as clear-cut.
B. PotentialChallengesin the FutureBetween Antitrust
Laws andAlgorithms
So far, there have been no cases under federal antitrust laws
where two competing companies' algorithms align and price their
products identically without a human 'meeting of the minds.' This
'algorithm agreement' would be a tacit agreement, which is already more difficult to identify than an express agreement. A pricing algorithm can hide collusive behavior more effectively than humans, making it more difficult to expose a tacit agreement. This is
an area of antitrust law that has become a concern for those tasked
69
with regulating -anti-competitive actions.1 One argument is if
"firms compete via algorithms that are fixed in the short run but
can [adapt] over time, collusion is not only possible but rather, it is
7 0 This antitrust issue becomes more tangled with the
inevitable.""
increase in oligopoly markets in the United States-including, arguably, the airline industry. 17 ' These two developments-the rise
of pricing algorithms and the oligopoly airline industry-set the
stage for how antitrust regulators should approach the airline industry.
1. Are Algorithms Perfecting the Art of Pricing or Collusion?
An issue at the core of algorithm decision-making is that the
algorithm may not make an altruistic decision when it focuses on
167
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REUTERS

(Aug. 17,. 2017, 7:36 PM),
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(discussing the issues pricing algorithms cause for antitrust laws).
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https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/the-oligopoly-problem.
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achieving a particular goal. What happens when an algorithm
must decide between something that is individually rational, and
its primary objective, but is socially inferior to something else? For
example, driverless cars use artificial intelligence and algorithms
in order to maneuver public streets." If the individual goal of the
autonomous vehicle's algorithm is to safely transport the rider
from one point to another, should it sacrifice the lives of five others
to accomplish its goal?" The data can become even more complex-consider if the five lives being sacrificed are all criminals.
Applying these questions in the context of this Article raises the
following question: What happens when a pricing algorithm must
decide between optimizing firm profits and protecting consumer
welfare? Competing airlines' pricing algorithms can raise airfare
to a rate that is highly profitable to the airlines, but harmful to consumers. This causes a predicament for the airline industry, who
almost entirely leaves pricing decisions to pricing algorithms." 4
To demonstrate how competing algorithms can lead to collusion, I will discuss two examples." The first example comes
from two pricing algorithms on Amazon. Two sellers of a biology
book (The Making ofa Flyby Peter Lawrence) allowed their prices
of this book to climb to over $23 million.'7 6 Seller one's pricing algorithm was set to price at 1.270589 times the price of seller two.7
Loz Blain, AI Algorithm Teaches a Car to Drive from Scratch in 20
Minutes, NEW ATLAS (July 5, 2018), https://newatlas.com/wayve-autonomouscar-machine-learning-learn-drive/55340/ (discussing that algorithms are the key
to autonomous driving vehicles).
173 Catie Keck, Self-Driving Cars Can't Choose Who to Kill yet, but People
Already Have Lots of Opinions, GIZMODO (Oct. 24, 2018, 11:00 PM), https://gizmodo.com/self-driving-cars-cant-choose-who-to-kill-yet-but-peop-1829984331
(discussing a test administered by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to
determine how society would want an autonomous vehicle to respond in a lifeand-death situation).
174 See supraSection II(b).
17 For an additional example that is discussed in the Abstract,
see generally
Thomas Heath, The Warning from JPMorganAbout Flash Crashes Ahead,
WASH. POsT (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.comlbusiness/economy/the-warning-from-j pmorgan-about-flash-crashesahead/2018/09/05/25b 1f90a-b 148-1 1e8-a20b5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.268f92924644
(discussing the "Flash
Crash" in the financial market).
176 Michael Eisen, Amazon's $23,698,655.93 Book About Flies, IT is NOT
JUNK (April 22, 2011), http://www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=358.
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Seller two's pricing algorithm was set to change its price once a
17 8
day to 0.9983 times seller one's book price. This example illustrates how two unsupervised algorithms can lead to an absurd result and possibly even collusion. The second example is a hypothetical scenario. There are two firms in a market that are pricing
17 9
their product competitively using pricing algorithms. Firm One
sets its algorithm to match any price increase that Firm Two
makes to its product, which may be viewed as a proposal to collude. Once Firm Two decodes Firm One's pricing algorithm
through trial and error or another method, Firm Two can price its
product at higher rates knowing that firm one is going to match it.
A human could potentially decode firm one's algorithm, but not as
efficient as an algorithm. 180 After the price raises, consumers are
subjected to a higher price without an express agreement between
Firm One and Two.1 8 1 Both of these examples illustrate how pricing algorithms can, and surely will, be used to maintain a harmful,
but legal, pricing scheme. If the firms employing these pricing algorithms have the oligopoly defense at their disposal, it makes collusion much harder to regulate.
An increase in oligopolies" 2 in the United States poses extensive risks, one of which is the difficulty of regulating anticompetitive behavior. This is increasingly relevant in the airline industry following the 2013 merger agreement between American
Airlines and U.S. Airways, as a result of which four airlines control
69% of domestic air travel. 183 As discussed, oligopolies possess a
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ation: People Prefer Algorithm to Human Judgment 3-4 (Harv. Bus. Sch.,
Working Paper No. 17-086, 2018).
11 Salcedo, supranote 130, at 3.
182 Oligopolies are "situation[s] in which a small number of organizations or
companies [have] control of an area of business, so that others have no share."
Oligopoly CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/oligopoly (last visited Feb. 2, 2019). In oligopoly markets, "profit
maximi[z]ing competitors set their strategies by paying close attention to how
their rivals are likely to react." Oligopoly ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (1999).

Jordan Weissmann, The Return of the Monopoly: An Infographic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/ar2013),
(Apr.
chive/2013/04/the-chartist/309271/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2019); see also US.
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defense to parallel pricing, which some consider to be a "crack in
the Sherman Act."184 Legal scholars have made arguments for both
sides of whether the Sherman Act can, and should, regulate oligopoly parallel pricing. Antitrust expert and Harvard Law School professor, Donald Turner, argues that when an oligopoly firm matches
a competitor's price change, it is merely responding to market
changes and optimizing its ability to be competitive in the market. 85 Turner further argues that it would be counterintuitive to
punish firms for being competitive in the market.'8 6 "[G]enerally,
interdependent parallel conduct, without more, has not been held
to satisfy [Sherman Act] Section 1's 'agreement' language. "187
However, other scholars, such as Richard Posner,1 88 argue that "[i]f
seller A restricts his output in the expectation that B will do likewise, and B restricts his output in a like expectation, there is quite
literally a meeting of the minds or mutual understanding even if
there is no overt communication."' 8 9 Consequently, the Supreme
Court has stated that Section One of the Sherman Act does not require proof of express collusion. 190 Regardless, there is concern that
oligopoly firms can price their services or products at a supracompetitive level, thus harming consumers.
When an oligopoly firm uses a pricing algorithm, the interdependent pricing issue increases. For example, a method that antitrust officials use to regulate cartels is a reliance on the cartels'

AIRLINES FOR AM., http://airlines.org/dataset/u-s-airline-mergers-and-acquisitions/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2019).
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1" Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time
of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1340 (2016); see supra Section
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disloyalty to one another,' 9 ' whether it be violating their price fixing agreement or defecting and cooperating with officials in order
to obtain a lessened punishment.1 92 Because of the immense size of
data that algorithms analyze, when one firm adjusts its rate, other
firms will quickly identify and match it, thereby lessening the effects of disloyalty.1 93 Additionally, where a human might make a
decision that negatively effects an oligopoly's long-term, supracompetitive level, pricing plan, algorithms are immortal and
not prone to make a short-term decision that would compromise
its long-term focus.1 94 A key component of antitrust law is fear of a
large punishment, which does not work on algorithms or machines
in the same manner as it does on humans."' Lastly, courts have
evaluated the "agreement" language in Section One of the Sherman
Act under contract standards-offer and acceptance or a meeting
of the minds.1 96 Claimants can point to plus factors, which make
parallel behavior more suspicious.' Again, however, robo-sellers
will not need to communicate with other algorithms to crunch data
and come to identical prices.19" Federal antitrust regulators will
have a hard time charging an algorithm with a Sherman Act (Section One) price-fixing violation using the meeting of the minds and
plus factors standards. 199
In effect, the challenges that an oligopoly firm would traditionally face can be easily maneuvered with the help of pricing
191 Christopher R Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 515,
518-19 (2004).
192 Id
193 Mehra, supranote 144, at 1348-49.
194
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at 1359 (citing Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208,
227 (1939) (holding that "[a]cceptance by competitors ... of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint
of inter- state commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful conspiracy under
the Sherman Act"); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928, 936
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that "[Toy] manufacturers were in effect being asked by
[Toys "R" Us] to reduce their output. . . [and] [i]t accomplished this goal by inducing [them] to collude, rather than compete."); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (dismissing for failure to state a claim with
"enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made")).
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algorithms. The airline industry is at the center of this issue that
antitrust regulators and scholars are struggling with because it is
viewed as an oligopoly that is at the cutting edge of pricing-algorithm use. The airline industry may deserve a customized approach to antitrust regulation.
2.

Should the Immovable Force (Antitrust Laws) Adapt?

In recent years, technology has evolved beyond what anyone ever thought it would. NASA manufactured and programmed
Voyager 1 in the 1970s without the use of computers. 200 Voyager 1
went on to travel 11.6 billion miles and reach interstellar space
even though it contained less memory than an iPhone 5.201 For better or worse, technology has evolved, and maybe antitrust laws
should as well. Antitrust laws have regulated businesses for over a
century with very little change-surviving the advent of cell
phones and the internet. However, oligopoly markets and pricing
algorithms provide a unique issue that might require adaptation.
The benefits that businesses gain from employing pricing algorithms are extraordinary, so banning them would be inappropriate. 202 If an adjustment to antitrust laws or governmental investigation methods allows for pricing algorithms to coexist with
competition laws, then change may be necessary. This section explores various options to properly regulate oligopolies that use
pricing algorithms.
The first option is to use the 'rule of reason.' Justice White
introduced the rule of reason in his dissenting opinion in United
States v. Trans-MissouriFreightAss'n-it was initially rejected. 203
Once Justice White became Chief Justice White, the Supreme
Court established that not all restraints on trade are illegal, only
those that are unreasonable. 204 The test involves identifying and
200 Amanda Wills, Voyager 1 Got to Deep Space on Less Memory than Your
iPhone5, MASHABLE (Sep. 12, 2013), https://mashable.com/2013/09/12/voyager1-iphone-5/#cMQ 1UNfVDOqW.
201
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9-14 (2017).
203 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 356-57
(1897) (White, J., dissenting).
204 Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?,
42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1375, 1392 (2009); see Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1(1911).
313

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[V ol. 3 2:2

weighing the procompetitive and anticompetitive effects on the
market to determine which predominates. 2 0 This obviously would
depart from the current per se rule that governs price fixing violations. The rule of reason analysis may appear to be a sufficient
analysis for the robo-seller but, in most cases, the benefits that pricing algorithms provide to businesses-labor cost-savings and competitive analysis-will outweigh the potential harm to competition.2 06

A second option is to treat a robo-seller as an agent of the
human that deploys it. Under current law, computer programs are
viewed as "instrumentalities of the persons who use them," and the
legal consequences of a technology malfunction fall back on the
human designer or user. 2 07 Accordingly, humans would be held liable for a robo-seller's anticompetitive pricing decisions. However,
antitrust laws look toward the intent of anticompetitive acts for
determining liability.208 If pricing algorithms use artificial intelligence to make independent pricing decisions, it might be difficult
to find that the human user manifested the requisite anticompetitive intent when they were not active in the algorithm's decision
making. 209 Therefore, treating the robo-seller as an agent may not
be the best method to regulate pricing algorithms in oligopolies.
The third option is to use current antitrust laws to regulate
the robo-seller. Specifically, the FTC could regulate the 'crack.' As
discussed earlier, the anticompetitive crack in antitrust laws is going to get worse with pricing algorithms.2 10 The crack is not illegal
but does factor in when regulators are attempting to block potential mergers."1
There are two methods I propose the FTC could utilize in
regulating pricing algorithms in an oligopoly market. First, the
FTC could use its unfair practices jurisdiction. 212 The most
Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule ofReason:From Balancingto Burden
Shifting, 1 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L. 1, 1-2 (2013) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United
20s
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important factor in evaluating unfair practices is whether there has
been consumer harm.2 13 An example of sufficient consumer harm
would be a seller leaving buyers with insufficient information to
make informed price comparisons. 21 4 I argue that the oligopoly
crack creates a similar injury-both lead to the consumer purchasing something at an uncompetitive rate. The second method for the
FTC to regulate pricing algorithms is through its developing bigdata regulation practice. The FTC recently made it apparent that
there needs to be an increase in efforts to regulate big-data agencies
that sell consumer data.215 Algorithms may not sell consumer data,
but they need a large amount of data to operate effectively.2 1 6
Therefore, the FTC is in an optimal position to monitor data used
by both big-data agencies and pricing algorithms.
The oligopoly crack in antitrust laws mirror what looks like
anticompetitive behavior. The crack will increase substantially
with the addition of pricing algorithms. Markets that already use
pricing algorithms, like the airline industry, are at the forefront of
this issue. Whether or not the oligopoly crack is worth regulators'
concerns and, possibly, legislative concerns is unfolding before our
eyes as technology like artificial intelligence advances far beyond
most imagined.

oppressive, or unscrupulous; and (3) offends public policy. Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
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TECHTARGET (Oct. 24, 2018), https://searchcrm.techtarget.com/podcast/Howenterprises-use-dynamic-pricing-algorithms-with-AI-CRM.

315

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

VI.

[V ol. 32:2

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF AIRLINE
PRICING

The airline industry is in a unique position. It is on the cusp
of new pricing technology that antitrust regulators are seeking
ways to regulate in a market defined as an oligopoly. It is clear that
under current federal antitrust laws, if airlines use pricing algorithms to fix prices pursuant to an explicit agreement, the government (and private parties) could seek legal recourse and would
most likely be successful in doing so. 2 17 A more difficult question is
whether current antitrust laws could properly regulate a tacit
agreement between two airlines' pricing algorithms. The Supreme
Court in Twombly indicated that a tacit agreement is subject to
antitrust regulations. 21 1But how can someone or something regulate a tacit agreement between two pricing algorithms in an oligopoly industry that can lean on the oligopoly defense to explain any
anticompetitive behavior? What about when artificial intelligence
utilizes self-learning to master the art of price fixing without being
detected? Airline consumers are already frustrated with the service
and pricing of modern airfare. Pricing algorithms in that market
will only make things worse.
When an inevitable moving force (technology) finds its way
around an immovable object (federal antitrust laws), the object
needs to adapt, not change. Most options to regulate the airlines'
oligopoly 'crack' are unhelpful. However, using current antitrust
laws-specifically the FTC-to promote transparency in the airlines' pricing algorithms would benefit consumers. 2 19 If airlines
provided the information their algorithms use to the FTC, they
could prevent anticompetitive behavior. This will also benefit airlines. Pricing algorithms are a necessity in the aviation industry.
By making their pricing algorithm's information available to the
FTC, airlines are able to continue using the technology. Additionally, being transparent with the FTC will prevent future lawsuits
217
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that lead to costly discovery while investigators determine whether
pricing algorithms were colluding.
I recommend the FTC regulate airlines' pricing algorithms
because the FTC has previously recognized a need to regulate big21 An algorithm
data"O and it has jurisdiction over unfairpractices.
is useless without large amounts of data. Data is how it learns and
improves. 2 Pricing algorithms in the aviation industry could lead
to unfair-pricing." 3 With the FTC regulating big-data and unfair
practices, regulating the data that airlines' pricing algorithms use
is a logical extension. The FTC may not be able to catch everything, but someday they may employ an algorithm that can.
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